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VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS AND SENTENCING 
HOMICIDE OFFENDERS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF  
RECENT CHANGES TO THE CRIMES (SENTENCING 





The use of victim impact statements (‘VISs’) from family victims in 
homicide matters, particularly as evidence of aggravating factors, is 
contentious in NSW courts. Until July 2014, the law prevented VISs 
influencing penalties imposed on homicide offenders (Previtera). 
However, the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 was 
amended in 2014 in order to overrule Previtera and enable VISs to 
‘count’ in sentencing homicide offenders. This article draws on a 
case study of 39 homicide sentencing judgments, July 2014–April 
2017, to determine whether, and if so the extent to which, the new 
law has changed the role of VISs from family victims in sentencing. 
It also considers the practical implications of these findings for 
future family victims and argues that not only has the new law made 
little practical difference to the use of VISs in homicide matters, but 
there are also potential adverse consequences for family victims in 
the sentencing process. 
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
Legislation has facilitated the submission of victim impact statements 
(‘VISs’) by crime victims to New South Wales (‘NSW’) sentencing courts  
for the past two decades.1 VISs are complex and highly nuanced narratives that 
recount the harm victims have suffered as a result of the crime, and serve 
multiple instrumental and expressive functions in the sentencing hearing.2 From 
an instrumental perspective, it is said that sentencing judges can use VISs to 
serve sentencing objectives such as deterrence, retribution and offender 
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1  Originally located in the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 23C and now located in the Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ss 26–30A. 
2  Tracey Booth, Accommodating Justice: Victim Impact Statements in the Sentencing Process (Federation 
Press, 2016); Julian V Roberts and Edna Erez, ‘Communication in Sentencing: Exploring the Expressive 
Function of Victim Impact Statements’ (2004) 10 International Review of Victimology 223. 
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desistance. 3  The information provided in VISs can assist judges to properly 
assess the seriousness of the offending and enhance the proportionality of the 
penalty imposed. 4  On the other hand, the expressive functions of a VIS are 
victim-focused. Erez argues that VISs were originally conceived to redress the 
exclusion and marginalisation of victims in adversarial sentencing hearings as 
well as improve their courtroom experiences.5 From this perspective, VISs can 
provide victims with a defined role in the sentencing process, a ‘voice’ to 
communicate their experiences of victimisation to the court, the offender and the 
wider community, and opportunities to be recognised and acknowledged.6 
Although VISs are a well-entrenched feature of the sentencing landscape in 
NSW (at least in superior courts), the role of VISs submitted by members of the 
deceased’s family (‘family victims’) in homicide cases has been contentious from 
the outset.7 Prior to 1 July 2014, the relevant legislation required the sentencing 
court to accept and acknowledge a VIS from a family victim. However, the court 
was not required to take that statement into account in the determination of the 
penalty unless it ‘considered it appropriate to do so’.8 Subsequently, a line of 
authority developed whereby it was regarded as inappropriate for a sentencing 
court to use a VIS from a family victim to influence penalty when the contents of 
that statement were limited to the impact of the deceased’s death on family 
members.9 This principle was said to be largely underpinned by a fundamental 
tenet of criminal justice – equality before the law – and articulated by Hunt CJ at 
CL in the seminal case of Previtera: ‘it would … be wholly inappropriate to 
                                                 
3  Booth, Accommodating Justice, above n 2, 34–6; Lynne Henderson, ‘The Wrongs of Victims Rights’ 
(1985) 37 Stanford Law Review 937, 986–1006; Andrew Ashworth, ‘Victim Impact Statements and 
Sentencing’ [1993] Criminal Law Review 498; Sam Garkawe, ‘The Role of the Victim during Criminal 
Proceedings’ (1994) 17 University of New South Wales Law Journal 595; Andrew Sanders et al, ‘Victim 
Impact Statements: Don’t Work, Can’t Work’ [2001] Criminal Law Review 447; Julian Roberts and 
Marie Manikis, ‘Victim Personal Statements: A Review of Empirical Research’ (Report to Commissioner 
for Victims and Witnesses in England and Wales, October 2011). 
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Sentencing and the Restorative Justice Paradigm: “Just Deserts” for Victims and Defendants Alike?’ 
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484. 
6  Roberts and Erez, above n 2; Sam Garkawe, ‘Victim Impact Statements and Sentencing’ (2007) 33 
Monash University Law Review 90. 
7  For the purposes of this article ‘homicide’ covers the following offences: murder, manslaughter and 
driving offences causing death. Under s 26 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) a 
family victim is a member of the primary victim’s immediate family, which means: the victim’s spouse; 
the victim’s de-facto partner; the person to whom the victim was engaged to be married; a parent, 
grandparent, guardian or step-parent of the victim; a child, grandchild or step-child of the victim or some 
other child for whom the victim was the guardian; and a brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, step-
brother or step-sister of the victim. 
8 As originally enacted, s 23C of Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW); later incorporated in s 28(4) of 
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). 
9  R v Previtera (1997) 94 A Crim R 76 (‘Previtera’); R v Bollen (1998) 99 A Crim R 510 (‘Bollen’); R v 
Dang [1999] NSWCCA 42; SBF v The Queen (2009) 198 A Crim R 219. 
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impose a harsher sentence upon an offender because the value of the life lost is 
perceived to be greater in the one case than it is in the other’.10  
In 2014, the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (‘CSPA’) was 
amended in order to overrule Previtera and change the approach of the NSW 
sentencing courts to the role of VISs in the sentencing of homicide offenders (the 
‘new law’). This new law is part of several sentencing laws implemented by the 
NSW government in the wake of the much publicised manslaughter of Thomas 
Kelly by Kieran Loveridge in 2012 and the perceived lenience of the penalty 
imposed on Loveridge in 2013 by the sentencing court.11 According to the then 
Attorney-General, this case brought the issue in Previtera ‘to a head’ and ‘the 
fact that family victim impact statements appeared not to count for anything was 
roundly condemned in some quarters’.12 Under the new law, in appropriate cases 
sentencing courts are enabled to take account of VISs from family victims in 
formulating penalty as an aspect of harm done to the community. The second 
reading speech for the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment (Family 
Member Victim Impact Statement) Bill 2014 (NSW) makes it clear that by the 
new law, the government intends for VISs from family victims to ‘count for 
something’ by having an enhanced role in the sentencing of homicide offenders.13 
This article explores whether and, if so, the extent to which the new law has 
changed the role of VISs from family victims in sentencing homicide offenders 
in NSW. It also considers the implications of the practical operation of the new 
law for future family victims. It is argued that not only has the new law made 
little practical difference to the way in which VISs are used by sentencing courts 
in homicide matters, but also that the operation of the new law has the potential 
for adverse consequences for family victims in the sentencing process.  
 
II   THE ROLE OF VISS IN SENTENCING HOMICIDE 
OFFENDERS BEFORE 1 JULY 2014 
A   Instrumental Function 
Following a decade of discussion and debate,14 the Criminal Procedure Act 
1986 (NSW) was amended in 1997 to enable both primary and family victims to 
submit VISs to the sentencing court. Section 23C(3) provided that the court must 
receive and acknowledge receipt of VISs from family victims but it ‘must not 
consider’ those statements ‘in connection with the determination of the 
                                                 
10  Previtera (1997) 94 A Crim R 76, 86–7. 
11  The sentencing and re-sentencing of Loveridge will be discussed in detail below. For a discussion of 
other related sentencing laws see Julia Quilter, ‘One-Punch Laws, Mandatory Minimums and “Alcohol-
Fuelled” as an Aggravating Factor: Implications for NSW Criminal Law’ (2014) 3(1) International 
Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 81. 
12  New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 7 May 2014, 28 361 (Brad Hazzard, 
Attorney-General). 
13  Ibid 28 360–2 (Brad Hazzard, Attorney-General). 
14  New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sentencing, Report No 79 (1996) 34 [2.22]. 
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punishment for the offence unless the court considers that it is appropriate to do 
so’.  
Shortly after it commenced, the effect of section 23C(3) was considered in 
Previtera. There, Hunt CJ at CL accepted a VIS from the deceased’s son but 
ruled that it was not appropriate to take it into account in the determination of 
penalty because it was limited to the impact of the deceased’s death on her 
family. His Honour approached the sentencing task on the basis that the objective 
circumstances of the offence encompassed the death of the deceased and the 
manner and circumstances in which she had died. Information regarding the 
impact of the deceased’s death on family members had no bearing on the death or 
the manner and circumstances of that death and was, therefore, not relevant to an 
assessment of the objective circumstances of the offending. In such 
circumstances, the VIS served no instrumental purpose in the assessment of the 
seriousness of the offence. Hunt CJ at CL was also concerned that taking account 
of VISs in such cases might lead to the imposition of a penalty reflecting the 
value and worthiness of the deceased person rather than the culpability of the 
offender. 
It is regarded by all thinking persons as offensive to fundamental concepts of 
equality and justice for criminal courts to value one life as greater than another. It 
would therefore be wholly inappropriate to impose a harsher sentence upon an 
offender because the value of the life lost is perceived to be greater in the one case 
than it is in the other.15 
Previtera was subsequently endorsed by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal 
(‘CCA’). 16  While the VIS provisions were reformatted and incorporated into 
section 28 of the CPSA in 1999, the essential wording of the provision remained 
the same.  
Section 3A(g) was inserted into the CSPA in 2002 and it stipulates that a 
purpose of sentencing is to ‘recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime 
and the community’.17 Spigelman CJ indicated in R v Berg that it might be time 
to revisit Previtera and consider whether this provision introduced a new element 
to the sentencing task.  
The reasons given in Previtera may need to be reconsidered in an appropriate case 
… It appears to me strongly arguable that the recognition of this purpose of 
sentencing [ie harm to the community] would encompass the kind of matters 
which are incorporated in a victim impact statement. It may in some cases, be 
appropriate to consider the contents of such statements in the sentencing exercise. 
This is not a purpose of sentencing recognised by Hunt CJ at CL in Previtera …18 
Implicit in these remarks is a conception of harm, relevant to the assessment 
of the objective seriousness of homicide offences, that is broader than that 
                                                 
15  Previtera (1997) 94 A Crim R 76, 86–7. 
16  Bollen (1998) 99 A Crim R 510, 529 (Hunt CJ at CL); R v Dang [1999] NSWCCA 42, [15] (Abadee J);  
R v Wickham [2004] NSWCCA 193, [25] (Howie J); R v FD (2006) 160 A Crim R 392, 415–16 (Sully J), 
428–9 (Hulme J); MAH v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 226; SBF v The Queen (2009) 198 A Crim R 219, 
237 [86] (Johnson J).  
17  Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment (Standard Minimum Sentencing) Act 2002 (NSW) sch 1 item 
1. 
18  [2004] NSWCCA 300, [43]–[44]. Although R v Berg involved a driving offence causing death, it was not 
an appropriate case to decide this issue because no VIS had been submitted by a family victim. 
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propounded by Hunt CJ at CL in Previtera (death and manner of death). It is a 
conception of harm that extends to the consequences of offending for family 
victims and the community. Though this issue was not specifically addressed or 
resolved in later cases, two subsequent CCA decisions suggest that nonetheless a 
shift did take place in sentencing homicide offenders whereby the broader 
conception of harm posited by Spigelman CJ was indeed being applied in the 
evaluation of the objective circumstances in homicide cases. 
The first case, MAH v The Queen, was an appeal against sentence where the 
Crown argued that the sentencing judge had erroneously used Previtera to 
support a ruling that the VIS was irrelevant.19 As a result of this error the judge 
did not take into account relevant circumstances including:  
the increased culpability of murdering a friend of whose family circumstances and 
likely effect upon whom he would have been aware, and, an increase of harm to a 
substantial degree by a breach of trust and an exacerbation of the harm done by 
the conduct of the respondent.20  
This ground of appeal was dismissed. Grove J, with whom the other members 
of the Court agreed, found that although the sentencing judge said that the rule in 
Previtera meant that the VIS was not relevant to penalty, this comment ‘should 
be understood in the context of [the later remarks]’ made by the sentencing judge 
to the effect that the impact of the death of the victim on the family was not a 
factor that could aggravate the offence.21 The consequences referred to by the 
Crown were part of the objective circumstances of the offence that the sentencing 
judge described and took into account in sentencing: rather than ignoring the VIS 
from the deceased’s mother, the judge in fact properly discussed its contents.22 
In the second case, SBF v The Queen, the appellant argued that the 
sentencing judge had taken account of the VISs submitted in a manner contrary 
to law because the judge had referred to the VISs extensively in the judgment 
without reference to Previtera.23 During sentencing the judge had discussed the 
content of the VISs and said: ‘I have taken these statements into account in the 
way that it is appropriate to do so on sentence’.24 In relation to the defence 
submissions regarding the VISs (where Previtera had been referred to in 
argument) the judge said:  
[defence counsel] submitted that whilst the victim impact statements excited 
feelings of sadness they were not relevant to sentencing proceedings. Whilst this 
may be strictly true, in my view they do no more than outline, in a very real way, a 
glimpse of what must be expected to flow from the deaths of two young men and 
the very serious injury of a young woman.25 
On appeal, the Crown argued that it was clear the sentencing judge was 
conscious of the limitations on the use of VISs imposed by Previtera and did not 
                                                 
19  [2006] NSWCCA 226, [59]. 
20  Ibid. 
21  Ibid [61]. 
22  Ibid [64]. 
23  (2009) 198 A Crim R 219, 236 [82].  
24  Ibid [57]. 
25  Ibid [62]. 
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make an error with regard to the use of VISs. 26  It was also submitted that 
Previtera does ‘not preclude the general relevance of the acknowledged fact that 
death is attended by distress and his Honour’s comments did no more than 
demonstrate that point by reference to the victim impact statements’.27 The CCA 
agreed with these submissions and found no evidence that the ‘experienced’ 
judge had taken account of the VISs contrary to the principle in Previtera.28 The 
Court also referred to section 3A(g) and noted that a purpose of sentencing is ‘to 
recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community’.29 In this 
context, the CCA found that there are no restrictions on the extent to which a 
sentencing judge can discuss VISs in a judgment and indeed, in this case: 
It is understandable … that his Honour set out the contents in some detail … The 
victim impact statements outlined the devastating consequences upon the families 
of the deceased young men and also the profound effects upon the young woman 
who survived the collision.30 
The approach of the CCA indicates that at the time the new law commenced 
the principle in Previtera was confined to prohibiting the use of VISs as evidence 
of aggravating factors in sentencing homicide offenders. Application of this 
principle did not mean that the harm caused to family victims was irrelevant and 
ignored by sentencing courts. The harm caused to family victims – that the dying 
and death of the deceased ‘is attended by distress’ – was clearly recognised as 
part of the objective circumstances of the offence and intrinsic to the nature and 
seriousness of homicide offending. From an instrumental and expressive 
perspective, acknowledgment and comment on VISs in sentencing judgments 
served to both recognise the impact of the offending on the family victims and 
exemplify why homicide offences are regarded as the most serious of offences. 
This position was also consistent with the approach taken to VISs in other 
Australian jurisdictions. For example, in R v Beckett Vincent J said: 
The introduction of such statements was not … intended to effect any change in 
the sentencing principles which govern the exercise of discretion by a sentencing 
judge. What such statements do is introduce in a more specific way factors which 
a court would ordinarily have considered in a broader context. They constitute a 
reminder of what might be described as the human impact of the crime.31 
 
B   Expressive Function 
VISs served a major expressive role in the sentencing process under the 
former law. Family victims were able to speak and be heard about the impact of 
the deceased’s death, and their experiences of victimisation were recognised and 
acknowledged by the court, particularly in those matters where victims elected to 
read their VIS aloud to the court.32 Research shows that expressive functions of 
VISs are particularly important for a large proportion of victims who choose to 
                                                 
26  Ibid [84]. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Ibid [90]–[91]. 
29  Ibid [89] (emphasis in original). 
30  Ibid [88]. 
31  [1998] VSC 219, [79]. 
32  Family victims have been able to read their VIS aloud to the court since 2003: see CSPA s 30A. 
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participate in the sentencing process.33 Indeed, there was consensus among family 
victims interviewed for a qualitative study of family victim participation in 
homicide sentencing in NSW (‘the NSW study’) that their VIS was a highly 
valued opportunity to be heard.34 Study participants appreciated the opportunity 
to talk about their experiences of victimisation and express their feelings about 
the crime to the court, the offender and the wider community.35 Also important 
was the opportunity for their VIS to be a device through which to make the 
deceased visible in the court proceedings. One family victim in this study said 
she was ‘highly motivated’ to submit a VIS because: 
I was very mindful that there was only one real aim of my VIS – to give a picture 
of [the deceased] how much he was loved and how much he was missed. The legal 
system is all about the other person, it’s all about the murderer, there’s nothing 
about the victim … so as far as I’m concerned [the deceased] was lost in the 
system … I just wanted to be a voice for [the deceased].36 
Another significant finding of the NSW study was use of sentencing 
judgments to convey recognition and acknowledgement of family victims’ loss 
and suffering through their comments made in relation to the VISs.37 Consistent 
with research, validation in this manner was particularly important for victims in 
the study and greatly appreciated.38 Not only did judges remark upon the nature 
and extent of family victims’ loss but also in some cases, commended victims 
variously for their courage, empathy and recovery.39  
In conclusion, it is evident that at the time the legislation was amended in 
2014, VISs did ‘count for something’ through both an instrumental and 
expressive role in the sentencing of homicide offenders. The next section turns to 
analyse the new law. 
 
III   THE NEW LAW 
This section commences with an analysis of R v Loveridge,40 the catalyst for 
the change in the law.  
                                                 
33  Edna Erez, Peter R Ibarra and Daniel M Downs, ‘Victim Welfare and Participation Reforms in the United 
States: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective’ in Edna Erez, Michael Kilchling and Jo-Anne 
Wemmers (eds), Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Victim Participation in Justice: International 
Perspectives (Carolina Academic Press, 2011) 15, 24–8; James Chalmers, Peter Duff and Fiona Leverick, 
‘Victim Impact Statements: Can Work, Do Work (For Those Who Bother to Make Them)’ [2007] 
Criminal Law Review 360; Victoria Department of Justice, Victim Support Agency, ‘A Victim’s Voice: 
Victim Impact Statements in Victoria: Findings of an Evaluation Into the Effectiveness of Victim Impact 
Statements in Victoria’ (Report, October 2009); Roberts and Manikis, ‘Victim Personal Statements’, 
above n 3. 
34  Booth, Accommodating Justice, above n 2, 64–5. 
35  Ibid. 
36  Quoted in ibid 65. 
37  Tracey Booth, ‘“Cooling Out” Victims of Crime: Managing Victim Participation in the Sentencing 
Process in a Superior Sentencing Court’ (2012) 45 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 
214. 
38  Roberts and Manikis, ‘Victim Personal Statements’, above n 3, 27. 
39  Booth, Accommodating Justice, above n 2, 150. 
40  R v Loveridge [2013] NSWSC 1638. 
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A   R v Loveridge  
Loveridge was 18 years old and heavily intoxicated when he committed five 
unprovoked assaults ‘randomly on unsuspecting strangers’ over a one-hour 
period in Kings Cross on 7 July 2012.41 One of these assaults was a single punch 
to Thomas Kelly’s head that caused him to fall and sustain fatal injuries as a 
result of his head hitting the footpath. 42  Loveridge pleaded guilty to three 
common assaults, one assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and 
manslaughter.43 At sentencing, Campbell J found that while the manslaughter 
offence fell into a ‘category of some seriousness’, 44  there were matters that 
favoured a degree of leniency including: an early guilty plea; genuine remorse; 
good prospects for rehabilitation; and the youth of the offender.45 Loveridge was 
sentenced to imprisonment for six years with a four-year non-parole period for 
the manslaughter offence and overall he was sentenced to a total of seven years 
and two months imprisonment with a non-parole period of five years and two 
months.46 
VISs submitted to the sentencing court by family victims were the subject of 
extensive comment in the judgment. Consistent with Previtera, Campbell J noted 
that the Court was not entitled to treat the ‘grief and anguish suffered by the 
family … as a circumstance aggravating the offence’.47 However, Campbell J 
also acknowledged the nature and extent of the loss and suffering of the 
deceased’s family as well as the personal qualities of the deceased: 
I have … listened very carefully to the statements read by or on behalf of Thomas’ 
immediate family, including his sister, maternal grandparents, and mother and 
father. From them I have formed the impression that Thomas must have been a 
wonderful young man full of promise for the future, and of whom his parents were 
justly proud. … I am sure that every right thinking member of our community has 
a great of deal of sympathy for the Kelly family. I offer sincere condolences on 
behalf of the Court, and personally.48 
In addition, the sentencing judge pointed out that the court could not  
take account of the attitude of the deceased’s family in relation to the sentence  
to be imposed in the matter.49 It seems likely that this remark was in response  
to matters raised in the VISs and the judge’s response reflects the common  
law position that the victim’s attitude to the penalty is generally regarded  
as irrelevant. 50  Ultimately, in this case, although the VISs were not used to 
aggravate the offending, it is clear that VISs were not ignored or regarded as 
irrelevant to the objective seriousness of the offence.  
                                                 
41  Ibid [1], [3]. 
42  Ibid [15], [18]. 
43  Ibid [1]. 
44  Ibid [61]. 
45  Ibid [64]–[69]. 
46  Ibid [79]–[80]. 
47  Ibid [7]. 
48  Ibid [5]–[6]. 
49  Ibid [8]. 
50  R v Palu (2002) 134 A Crim R 174, 183–4 [37] (Howie J). 
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This case attracted extensive media attention and community disquiet, 
particularly in relation to the perceived leniency of the penalty imposed.51 The 
subsequent Crown appeal against sentence was upheld; the original sentences 
were quashed and Loveridge was resentenced to a significantly higher penalty. 
For the manslaughter of Thomas Kelly, he was sentenced to 10 years and 6 
months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 7 years, and the overall penalty 
was 13 years and 5 months with a non-parole period of 9 years and 9 months.52 
The CCA described the manslaughter as ‘grave’ and found that the sentencing 
judge gave too much weight to the offender’s subjective circumstances and 
insufficient weight to general and personal deterrence.53 General deterrence was a 
particularly significant consideration in this case because of the nature of the 
crime – unprovoked ‘alcohol-fuelled’ violence in a public space.54 The CCA also 
acknowledged the VISs, before the sentencing court, noting that ‘[t]hese 
statements reflect the profound grief experienced by members of Mr Kelly’s 
family … It is entirely apparent that the consequences of the loss … in these 
tragic circumstances, will be not just long lasting but permanent’.55 
 
B   Analysis of the New Law 
The new provisions of the CSPA became operative on 1 July 2014 and apply 
to the sentencing of homicide offenders, regardless of the date when the offence 
was committed, unless the offender was convicted before the date of 
commencement or the court accepted a plea of guilty which was not withdrawn 
before that date. Section 28 now provides so far as relevant to VISs from family 
victims: 
(3) If the primary victim has died as a direct result of the offence, a court must 
receive a victim impact statement given by a family victim and acknowledge its 
receipt, and may make any comment on it that the court considers appropriate. 
(4) A victim impact statement given by a family victim may, on the application of 
the prosecutor and if the court considers it appropriate to do so, be considered and 
taken into account by a court in connection with the determination of the 
punishment for the offence on the basis that the harmful impact of the primary 
victim’s death on the members of the primary victim’s immediate family is an 
aspect of harm done to the community. 
(4A) Subsection (4) does not affect the application of the law of evidence in 
proceedings relating to sentencing. 
Subsection (3) is unchanged from the former law. Subsection (4A) is an 
entirely new provision which appears designed to enable the cross-examination 
                                                 
51  See, eg, Amy Dale, ‘Ray Hadley Slams “Weak-Kneed” Justice System for King-Hit Killer Kieran 
Loveridge’s Four-year Jail Term’, The Daily Telegraph (online), 8 November 2013 <http://www.daily 
telegraph.com.au/ray-hadley-slams-weakkneed-justice-system-for-kinghit-killer-kieran-loveridges-
fouryear-jail-term/news-story/3886b0b019dbf52b350f57351811412d>. 
52  R v Loveridge (2014) 243 A Crim R 31, 66 [280], 66–7 [282] (The Court). 
53  Ibid 46 [109], 48 [129], 59 [217]–[218], 61 [230]. 
54  Ibid 46 [105].  
55  Ibid 43–4 [90]. 
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of family victims on their VIS. Previously courts had taken the view that victims 
could not be cross-examined on their statements.56  
Key changes to the law are located in subsection (4). The former provision 
stipulated that the court ‘must not’ take account of VISs from family victims 
unless it considered it appropriate to do so. Under the new law, a sentencing 
court ‘may’ take account of a VIS by a family victim in the determination of the 
penalty, on the basis that the harmful impact on the deceased’s family is an 
aspect of harm done to the community, provided that: 
 The prosecution makes an application that the court does take account of 
the VIS; and  
 The court considers it appropriate to do so.  
Aside from the change in language from the mandatory ‘must not’ to the 
discretionary ‘may’, with regard to taking account of VISs in particular 
circumstances, a significant change is the express link made between the contents 
of VISs from family victims to the sentencing purpose as set out in section 3A(g) 
of the CSPA to recognise the harm done to the community. It is also significant 
that the test of ‘appropriateness’ has been retained although, as was the case with 
the law it replaces, the legislature provides no guidance in relation to the 
application of the test. In a similar vein, the legislation does not clarify how VISs 
are to be taken into account or what weight is to be afforded to them in the 
process. These remain matters for the courts. The next section considers the 
application and the interpretation of the new law. 
 
1 Application and Interpretation of the New Law 
This section draws on a case study of 39 murder or manslaughter sentencing 
judgments handed down by the NSW Supreme Court between 1 July 2014 and 
13 April 2017, and one appellate decision, Sumpton v The Queen [2016] 
NSWCCA 162 (‘Sumpton’), that addresses the new law. Judgments included in 
the case study were identified from searches of two databases – Austlii and 
BarNet Jade. Purposive sampling techniques were used to select judgments for 
inclusion in the case study.57 The criteria for inclusion were: the offender was 
sentenced for a homicide offence in the NSW Supreme Court;58 the new law 
applied to sentencing the offender (given the date of a guilty plea and/or 
conviction following trial);59 and VISs were submitted by family victims.60 A 
total of 71 judgments meeting these criteria were identified during the relevant 
time period and all of these judgments were originally included in the case study. 
Each judgment was analysed using a doctrinal approach to determine how the 
                                                 
56  R v Wilson [2005] NSWCCA 219, [27] (Simpson J). 
57  David Silverman, Doing Qualitative Research (Sage, 3rd ed, 2010) 141–3.  
58  In this context, ‘homicide offence’ means murder or manslaughter. 
59  Whether or not the new law applied was determined by the relevant dates of a guilty plea or conviction 
after trial revealed in the sentencing judgments. 
60  Whether family victims submitted a VIS in a particular case was determined according to whether the 
VIS was referred to in the sentencing judgment. Judgments were only included if a sentencing judge 
indicated on the face of the judgment that a VIS was submitted.  
140 UNSW Law Journal Volume 41(1) 
new law was interpreted and applied, and in particular whether and, if so how, 
the sentencing court used the VIS to formulate penalty. Initial analysis revealed 
however that the prosecution did not apply to have the VISs taken into account in 
all of these matters. In fact, prosecution applications were expressly noted in only 
39 decisions.61 In another eight matters,62 the sentencing judges expressly noted 
that the prosecution did not make such an application; in those latter cases, the 
sentencing judges treated the VISs in accordance with the former law and 
expressly stated that the VISs were not taken into account. There was no 
reference to a prosecution application or the provisions of the new law in the 
remaining 24 matters; in those cases, the VISs were acknowledged by the 
sentencing judge generally with reference to the justice principles in Previtera 
and with no indication as to the use of those statements in determining penalty. 
For example, in R v Kahn, Fullerton J said:  
By receiving their statements and inviting then to be read, the Court recognises the 
far reaching and substantial impact of the deaths of the deceased on all their 
family members. Their understandable suffering cannot, however, influence the 
sentences [to be imposed] … The law does not differentiate between the value of 
life lost or permit a sentencing judge to factor into an otherwise appropriate 
sentence any additional penalty because a deceased person was loved and 
surrounded by family and friends who have suffered through their death. It is the 
criminal culpability in the taking of life itself that is the departure point for the 
appointment of criminal punishment.63 
For the purposes of gathering data on the interpretation and application of the 
new law by sentencing courts, the case study ultimately comprised only those 
matters where the prosecution applied to have the VISs taken into account in 
sentencing (n=39). 
If VISs are to be taken into account under the new law, it is on the basis that 
the harm sustained by the family victims is an aspect of harm done to the 
community. Shortly after the new law commenced some sentencing courts 
articulated a specific connection between the harm suffered by the family victims 
and harm to the community in the particular circumstances.64 For instance, in R v 
Hines [No 3] the sentencing judge addressed the family victims as follows in his 
sentencing judgment:  
your harm is an aspect of the community’s harm. Alan Hines, through his senior 
counsel and experienced solicitor, agrees that I should take it into account. He 
recognizes that Aaron [the deceased] was the father of two little girls, one of 
whom is severely disabled and that the whole community will be affected in the 
long run by the care required for Ashantie. He acknowledges that Wilcannia is a 
                                                 
61  There is no indication in the judgments that the applications were opposed. 
62  R v AN [2014] NSWSC 1879; R v Beattie [No 4] [2015] NSWSC 961; R v Hadchiti [2017] NSWSC 292; 
R v JH [2014] NSWSC 1878; R v Lambaditis [2015] NSWSC 746; R v Perkins [2016] NSWSC 1080;  
R v SB [2015] NSWSC 659; R v Silva [2015] NSWSC 148. It is important to note that this might well 
have been the case in other matters but, for the purposes of this analysis, only those cases where it was 
expressly stated in the sentencing judgment that the Crown did not make an application have been 
counted. 
63  [2016] NSWSC 1073, [50]. 
64  R v Hines [No 3] [2014] NSWSC 1273, [75]–[76] (Hamill J) (‘Hines [No 3]’); R v Barbieri [2014] 
NSWSC 1808, [11] (Hulme J). 
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small, close-knit community and that Aaron was admired as a good football player 
and young member of that community.65 
The case study data reveal however the emergence of a line of authority 
whereby it is not necessary to articulate a specific connection in each case in 
order for the harm sustained by the family victims to be regarded as an aspect of 
harm done to the community. In R v Halloun McCallum J said: 
I would construe the new provision as an important mechanism for ensuring that 
the evidence of family victims is placed before the court to give texture to the 
undoubted proposition that every unlawful taking of a human life harms the 
community in some way. In that way, the provision serves the purposes of 
sentencing stated in s 3A of the Act, one of which is to recognise the harm done to 
the victim of the crime and the community.66 
Halloun was cited with approval by the CCA in Sumpton.67 In the latter case, 
the appellant appealed against sentence on the basis that the sentencing judge had 
wrongly assessed the objective seriousness of the offence as being ‘comfortably 
above the middle range’ and the penalty imposed was too high.68 One submission 
in support of the appeal related to the sentencing judge’s use of VISs. 69  At 
sentencing, in response to the prosecution’s application under section 28(4) for 
the sentencing judge to take account of the VISs in determining penalty, the 
offender had conceded that the harm done to the deceased’s family revealed by 
the VISs was an aspect of harm done to the community. In these circumstances, 
the sentencing judge described the concessions as ‘sensible’ and found it was 
appropriate to take the VISs into account in sentencing.70  
On appeal, the appellant submitted that section 28(4) was only ‘technically 
applicable’ and the reference to ‘“harm done to the community” had no real 
application, and was not deserving of any weight’.71 The CCA found however 
that the sentencing judge had not erred in ‘in his assessment of the objective 
seriousness of the offending’.72 Bellew J, with whom the other members of the 
appeal Court agreed, said that the offender’s concession to take account of the 
harm done to the deceased’s family was appropriate and consistent with 
authority, citing Halloun (extracted above) with approval. 73  His Honour also 
approved the following observation made by Johnson J in R v Pluis: 
I accept that the harmful impact of the offence upon the primary victim’s 
immediate family is an aspect of harm done to the community in this case. Under 
the law, all lives are precious and the death of any person is a harm inflicted on the 
community in general … Harm to the community is always caused when an 
innocent life is taken, but the way in which the harm is felt varies.74 
                                                 
65  [2014] NSWSC 1273, [75] (Hamill J). 
66  [2014] NSWSC 1705, [46] (‘Halloun’). 
67  [2016] NSWCCA 162, [153] (Bellew J). 
68  Ibid [125]–[130], [132]–[139]. 
69  Ibid [136]–[139]. 
70  R v Sumpton [No 4] [2015] NSWSC 684, [43] (Hamill J). 
71  Sumpton [2016] NSWCCA 162, [139]. 
72 Ibid [156] (Bellew J). 
73 Ibid [153]. 
74  [2015] NSWSC 320, [103] (‘Pluis’), quoted in ibid [155]. 
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Sumpton is authority for the principle that the harm caused to family victims 
as a result of the death of the primary victim is an aspect of harm done to the 
community and relevant to the assessment of the objective circumstances of 
sentencing. There is no need to establish in each case a connection between the 
particular harm sustained by family victims as detailed in the VISs and the 
ensuing harm done to the community. Furthermore, the statement in Pluis above 
that ‘[h]arm to the community is always caused when an innocent life is taken’ 
suggests that there is no need for the harm sustained by the family victims to 
meet a particular ‘standard’ in order to amount to harm done to the community. 
The case study data were also analysed in relation to the use of VISs in the 
determination of penalty. In the majority of matters (n=23), sentencing judges 
expressly ‘took account of’ the harmful impact of the deceased’s death evidenced 
by their VISs as an aspect of harm done to the community though there was no 
indication of what weight, if any, was afforded the VIS in the process.75 For 
example, in R v Haines Hulme AJ said:  
Almost invariably the violent death of a family member imposes suffering on near 
relatives. Nevertheless, I accept that it is appropriate to take the suffering evident 
in the Victim Impact Statements into account in determining the appropriate 
sentence and I will do so.76 
Conversely, the sentencing judge in R v Towney [No 2] who took account of 
the VIS, stipulated that the VIS was not an aggravating factor; rather it reflected 
harm that was inherent in the offence of murder as committed in the 
circumstances of that case.77 Similarly, in three further matters, the sentencing 
judges also took account of the VISs in sentencing but each stated expressly that 
the VIS did not influence the ultimate penalty imposed on the offender.78 For 
example, in Spicer, Harrison J said that in taking account of the VISs he wished 
to make clear: ‘that I would have imposed the sentence that I intend to impose 
even if the statements from Mr and Mrs Foreman had not been provided to the 
court’.79 
While taking account of the VISs in sentencing, judges in another eight 
matters responded to the issue of appropriateness under the new law by 
reiterating the justice concerns expressed in Previtera and in particular the view 
                                                 
75  R v Abdallah [2015] NSWSC 531; R v Barbieri [2014] NSWSC 1808; R v Briggs [No 9] [2014] NSWSC 
1805; R v Do [No 4] [2015] NSWSC 512; R v Droudis [No 16] [2017] NSWSC 20; R v Fang [No 4] 
[2017] NSWSC 323; R v Haines [2015] NSWSC 390; R v Haines [No 3] [2016] NSWSC 1812; R v Hart 
[No 5] [2016] NSWSC 1612; R v Hunter [No 15] [2014] NSWSC 1456; R v Johnson [2015] NSWSC 31; 
R v Jones [No 3] [2014] NSWSC 1511; R v Kelsall [2015] NSWSC 480; R v KJ [2015] NSWSC 767;  
R v Lane [No 3] [2015] NSWSC 118; R v Matthews [2015] NSWSC 49; Patel [No 2] [2015] NSWSC 
1381; Plius [2015] NSWSC 320; R v Quinn [No 3] [2016] NSWSC 1699; R v Serutawake [2014] 
NSWSC 1762; R v Sumpton [No 4] [2015] NSWSC 684; R v Wang [2016] NSWSC 222; R v Wong 
[2015] NSWSC 1612. 
76  [2015] NSWSC 390, [37] (Hulme AJ). 
77  [2016] NSWSC 97, [57] (Fagan J). 
78  R v D’Ambrosio [2014] NSWSC 1685, [42]; R v Dyer [2014] NSWSC 1809, [11]; R v Spicer [2015] 
NSWSC 519, [91] (‘Spicer’). 
79  [2015] NSWSC 519, [91]. 
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that one life cannot be valued more highly than another.80 In Hines [No 3] for 
example, his Honour noted the lack of guidance in the new law as to when it is 
appropriate to take account of VISs and, referring to the justice concerns 
expressed in Previtera, he said:  
The reality is that homicide and other crimes where people are killed have 
devastating and long-term effects in every case. The exception may be a friendless 
or homeless member of the community. Is the law to regard a homeless, unloved 
person’s life as less valuable than another’s? This strikes me as being 
philosophically offensive.81 
McCallum J also referred to the lack of guidance in the new law in Halloun 
and said: ‘It seems unthinkable that the amendment reflects an acceptance by the 
legislature that some lives are more valuable to the community than others’.82 As 
already noted above, on her Honour’s interpretation of the provision, VISs are 
used to recognise harm caused to family victims and ‘give texture’ to the 
proposition that harm suffered by the family victim also harms the community. 
McCallum J’s interpretation of the provision was expressly adopted in four 
subsequent decisions included in this case study.83  
In a marked departure from the previous law, the sentencing judges in two of 
the 39 matters where the prosecution made an application used the VISs from 
family victims as evidence of an aggravating factor, substantial emotional harm 
under section 21A(2)(g) of the CSPA.84 These cases will be discussed in further 
detail below. 
Prosecution applications were unsuccessful in two cases. In R v Aller [No 2], 
the sentencing judge noted that the prosecution application was not developed 
beyond a reference to the new law and ruled that it was not appropriate to take 
the VISs into account in determining the limiting term.85 In R v Merrick [No 5], 
the prosecution submitted that the VISs should be used in determining penalty 
because the harm sustained by family victims in losing their mother was more 
serious, or ‘elevated’, than would normally be anticipated.86  In response, the 
offender argued that although the loss to the deceased’s family was ‘considerable 
… the children are well supported, and their loss is mitigated to some degree by 
the family love with which they are surrounded’.87 The sentencing judge found 
that the VISs did not ‘worsen the offender’s crime’; rather the VISs were 
‘demonstrative of the harm that is inherent in an offence of manslaughter, and 
                                                 
80  R v Grogan [2017] NSWSC 378, [22] (Hidden AJ); Halloun [2014] NSWSC 1705, [46] (McCallum J); 
Hines [No 3] [2014] NSWSC 1273, [78]–[84] (Hamill J); R v Jenbare [2016] NSWSC 1317, [46] 
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82  [2014] NSWSC 1705, [46]. 
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85  [2015] NSWSC 402, [13] (Hidden J). 
86  [2016] NSWSC 661, [63] (Wilson J). 
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144 UNSW Law Journal Volume 41(1) 
should be viewed consistently with the principles expressed in R v Previtera’.88 
Furthermore: 
An assessment of that nature would involve the sentencing courts in an evaluation 
of the value of an individual life, measured by the pain and loss caused by the 
death. By that exercise, for example, the unlawful killing of a skilled doctor could 
be regarded more seriously than the unlawful killing of someone without those 
skills. That is an assessment no court should undertake in my view, because the 
gravity of the crime is the unlawful taking of a human life.89 
The case study reveals that despite the opportunities provided by the new 
law, the VISs were not generally used to increase the penalty imposed on the 
offender. While the VISs were said to be taken into account in the vast majority 
of sentencing judgments in the case study, there was no indication of the weight, 
if any, attached to the statements in the process. As already noted,  the legislature 
does not clarify how VISs are to be taken into account, the weight to be afforded 
to them in this process, and these questions were not addressed by the CCA in 
Sumpton. In this regard, it is highly significant that the VISs were expressly used 
as evidence of an aggravating factor in only two of the 39 judgments (8 per cent). 
It is also noteworthy that the justice issues raised by Previtera continued to 
resonate in at least nine of the 39 judgments (over 25 per cent).  
Overall, the case study data indicate that in more than 90 per cent of matters, 
the new law did not substantially change the sentencing courts’ approach to the 
use of VISs in the sentencing of homicide offenders. The harm suffered by 
family victims and the community was regarded as intrinsic to the nature of 
homicide offending, anticipated by the sentencing court and taken into account in 
sentencing as part of the objective circumstances of the offence. The objective 
circumstances of the offence together with the personal circumstances of the 
offender and any other relevant factors formed the mix from which, by a process 
of instinctive synthesis, the judge determined the appropriate penalty 
proportionate to the offending. It is clear that this approach is very similar to the 
approach under the former law examined above. And indeed, this point was 
recognised by the CCA in Sumpton where Davies J’s observation in R v Do [No 
4] was quoted with approval: ‘It is far from clear what practical difference has 
been made by the amendment’.90  
It is contended that the contentious nature of VISs as evidential devices 
generally, and more specific concerns regarding VISs as evidence of aggravating 
factors in the context of homicide sentencing, are two key issues that have 
underpinned the courts’ approach to the new law. These issues will be addressed 
in the following two sections. 
  
2 The Evidential Status of VISs 
The evidential status of VISs has been a source of controversy in non-
homicide cases and, traditionally, the courts have approached the use of VISs as 
                                                 
88  Ibid [67] (Wilson J). 
89  Ibid [66] (Wilson J). 
90  [2015] NSWSC 512, [50], cited in Sumpton [2016] NSWCCA 162, [154] (Bellew J). 
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evidence of harm caused by the offence ‘with caution and a critical eye’. 91 
Concerns about the quality of VISs as evidence of harm in sentencing reflect the 
disjuncture between the traditional and respected ‘legal’ forms of evidence and 
the subjective and unconventional nature of VISs.92 From a legal perspective, 
VISs are a ‘particular species of evidence’ that is not equivalent to prosecution 
evidence;93 they are not submitted by a party to the proceedings, and they are not 
submitted in a recognised legal form. In NSW, written VISs are not sworn 
documents and oral VISs are not presented under oath or affirmation. A VIS is 
presented as a narrative rather than in the conventional question and answer 
format. There are limited opportunities for the offender to test the veracity of the 
contents of the statement and penalties are not imposed on victims if their 
statements are untrue. These issues are complicated by the fact that VISs are not 
‘objective’ statements of harm.94 Research has shown that VISs by family victims 
are highly personal, subjective narratives of suffering experienced by the 
deceased’s family.95  
Generally, the use of VISs is unproblematic for the courts when the harm 
described in the VIS reflects the nature and extent of harm that would be an 
anticipated consequence of the offending and/or it is conceded by the offender. 
More problematic are those cases where the issue is whether a VIS can be used 
as evidence of unanticipated harm and/or an aggravating factor. Aggravating 
factors must be proved beyond reasonable doubt unless conceded by the 
offender,96 and one commentator has argued in relation to the new law that it will 
be difficult to use VISs from family victims as evidence of aggravating factors 
because it is unlikely that those VISs could meet this ‘strict standard’.97  
Whether or not VISs can be used as evidence to prove an aggravating factor 
has been the subject of debate before the CCA in the context of non-homicide 
offences.98 Justice Wood’s much-quoted warning in relation to the use of VISs 
for this purpose in R v Berg is apposite: 
I would sound a note of caution in relation to the proper approach to fact-finding 
concerning the impact of a crime upon other members of the community or, upon 
the victim. If that is to be achieved by way of victim impact statements, then an 
                                                 
91  Booth, Accommodating Justice, above n 2, 43.  
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injustice may occur in relation to a person standing for sentence, in so far as the 
maker of the statement would not normally be available for cross-examination. … 
extreme care needs to be taken by those who prosecute and defend these cases, 
and also by trial Judges in always ensuring that there is a proper evidentiary basis 
for any findings of fact which go towards aggravating or mitigating a sentence.99 
This issue was considered by the CCA in its recent decision, Tuala. Tuala 
shot at the victim at close range three times and was convicted of the discharge of 
a firearm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. At sentencing, the victim 
submitted a VIS claiming he had sustained significant and continuing physical, 
psychological, emotional and financial harms as a result of the offence. While the 
offender did not object to the admission of the VIS, he did submit that it could 
not be relied upon because the victim ‘was not a truthful person’, and ‘the Court 
should take with some scepticism what [the victim] says’.100  
The prosecution appealed against the manifest inadequacy of the sentence 
imposed and relied on the VIS to argue that the victim had sustained substantial 
harm that amounted to an aggravating factor. Accordingly, the issue for the CCA 
was whether or not an unsworn VIS, not tested by cross-examination, could 
prove harm that goes beyond that which ‘would ordinarily be expected of the 
offence charged’, to the requisite standard – beyond reasonable doubt.101 Simpson 
J (with whom the other members of the Court agreed) found that VISs could 
provide such evidence though ‘each case will depend on its own facts and 
circumstances’. 102  Relevant facts and circumstances to be considered by the 
sentencing court in this context include:  
 the manner in which the hearing was conducted – that is, whether the 
VISs were admitted with or without objection and/or whether the 
offender made submissions as to the weight to be attached to the 
statement;  
 the credibility of the victim’s account in the VIS in light of their own or 
other evidence at the trial and consistency with other relevant evidence 
such as an agreed statement of facts; and  
 the existence of corroborative evidence in more traditional legal forms 
such as expert reports.103 
Her Honour warned however that ‘considerable caution must be exercised 
before the victim impact statement can be used to establish an aggravating factor 
to the requisite standard’ in cases where:  
 the facts to which the [VIS] attests are in question; or 
 the credibility of the victim is in question; or 
 the harm which the statement asserts goes well beyond that which might 
ordinarily be expected of that particular offence; or 
 the content of the [VIS] is the only evidence of harm.104 
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Ultimately, in the circumstances of Tuala, which included the fact that the 
offender had made submissions during the sentencing hearing regarding the 
weight to be given to the VIS, the Court ruled that the VIS could not be used to 
prove harm more substantial than that which could ordinarily be expected. The 
sentencing judge’s assessment that the victim was not a particularly credible 
witness meant that ‘doubt must attend his assertion of financial loss and ongoing 
disability’.105  
Subject to the facts and circumstances of the case, it is clear from Tuala that 
VISs can provide evidence of harm that amounts to an aggravating factor to the 
requisite standard. The next section turns to consider the specific issues that arise 
in relation to the use of VISs from family victims as evidence of an aggravating 
factor in sentencing homicide offenders under the new law. 
 
3 VISs As Evidence of Aggravation in Homicide Matters 
Section 21A(2)(g) of the CSPA provides that a sentencing court must take 
into account substantial ‘injury, emotional harm, loss or damage caused by the 
offence’ as an aggravating factor. Given the nature of harm suffered by family 
victims, substantial emotional harm under this provision is the aggravating factor 
most likely to be raised in homicide cases.106 Harm will be ‘substantial’ for the 
purposes of this provision when it is significantly more serious than that which 
an ‘ordinary’ person would have suffered when subjected to the same or similar 
offence.107 In Huynh v The Queen, the CCA explained further that ‘emotional 
harm qualified by the adjective substantial may be taken to be a reference to an 
appreciable psychological injury whether permanent or not. It refers to something 
more than the transient, or temporary’.108 However, as pointed out by the CCA in 
Elyard v The Queen, the legislation does not make clear how the provision is to 
be applied,109 though it should be noted that under section 21A(5) the presence of 
an aggravating factor need not necessarily lead to a more severe penalty. 
The case study revealed two cases where VISs from family victims were used 
as evidence of substantial emotional harm and an aggravating factor under 
section 21A(2)(g).110 The offender in the first of these cases, Breen, killed his 
father and step-mother in a particularly violent manner in front of their young 
children and was on his way to kill other family members including his mother 
when he was apprehended.111 Several VISs were submitted by family victims 
detailing extensive emotional and psychological trauma including: post-traumatic 
stress disorder; self-harm; suicidal thoughts; depression; anxiety; and guilt.112 The 
sentencing judge described the offender’s mother as ‘intensely traumatised’, 
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‘constantly haunted by the realisation that her son was coming to kill her’, and 
noted her VISs expressed ‘overwhelming trauma’.113 For the judge, ‘[s]imply 
listening to and reading these statements is a distressing experience in itself’.114 
The Court used the VISs as evidence of emotional harm that was so substantial as 
to go ‘well beyond what would be expected as … “normal”’, constituting an 
aggravating factor that is ‘inherent in the offence of murder’.115 In making this 
evaluation, the judge did not articulate the expected level of emotional harm 
sustained by family victims, remarking, ‘if indeed there is such a thing as a 
normal consequence in relation to this offence’.116 
In the second case, Anderson, the offender was convicted of excessive self-
defence manslaughter of his former partner. 117  At the time of her death, the 
deceased was five to six months pregnant with the offender’s child. The 
sentencing judge described the VIS submitted by the deceased’s mother as 
expressing: 
in very clear terms the grievous effect and the immense loss arising from the death 
of her daughter … and the impact it has had upon the members of her family. The 
loss of a loved one, in the circumstances with which this case is concerned, is 
exceptionally painful and tragic.118 
The Court found that the VIS provided evidence of substantial emotional loss 
and damage ‘caused in particular to the deceased’s mother and family, by her 
daughter’s death involving as it did the loss of her daughter’s unborn child’.119 
This harm went ‘beyond the emotional harm or loss that might otherwise have 
been expected’120 although, similar to Breen, the expected consequences of the 
offending were not established. 
An important caveat to the application of section 21A(2)(g) is that the harm 
alleged to be so substantial cannot be taken into account as an aggravating factor 
if it is already an element or ‘an inherent characteristic’ of the offence.121 If the 
harm that is the subject of enquiry is an element or an inherent characteristic of 
the offence, then it is part of the objective circumstances or seriousness of the 
offence. The maximum penalty (and minimum non-parole period if relevant) 
indicates the seriousness with which the legislature views a particular crime and 
that seriousness reflects the core elements and inherent characteristics of the 
offending.122 To take that harm into account as an aggravating factor is to risk 
‘double counting’ and amount to a sentencing error.123 
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The emotional harm suffered by family victims as a result of the death of the 
primary victim is an inherent characteristic of a homicide offence and thereby 
relevant to the assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending. It is also 
clear that given the nature and seriousness of homicide offending, the emotional 
harm suffered by family victims is likely to be substantial. Homicide offences are 
among the most serious offences in NSW. The maximum penalties for murder 
and manslaughter in particular are severe and convey the extreme seriousness 
with which the legislature regards homicide offending. To the extent that VISs 
from family victims describe the consequences of the killing for the deceased’s 
family, the devastating loss, suffering and trauma, they reflect substantial 
emotional harm that is intrinsic to the nature of homicide offending and 
exemplify why the taking of a human life is such a serious offence. R v 
Birmingham [No 2] provides an example of this argument. There, the South 
Australian Supreme Court found that in the circumstances of the offending, the 
harm sustained by the family victims and detailed in their VISs was of a nature 
and extent to be anticipated and not an aggravating factor: 
given the youth of the deceased and the circumstances of his death, the grief and 
outrage felt by the surviving parents is very much what I might have expected, 
even if I had not had the benefit of the victim impact statements … It follows that 
even without the benefit of those statements, I doubt that I would have imposed a 
less severe sentence.124 
A finding that a VIS from a family victim is evidence of harm so serious that 
it amounts to an aggravating factor requires the sentencing court to find that the 
depth of suffering revealed by the VISs exceeds the suffering already anticipated 
and intrinsic to the seriousness of the offence. While the sentencing courts in 
both Breen and Anderson found the harm suffered to be substantial, they did not 
articulate the ‘normal’ level of emotional harm caused to family victims by 
homicide offending (that is, intrinsic to the offence). However, it appears that the 
law does not require sentencing courts to establish the anticipated or ‘normal’ 
level of harm in order to find the harm suffered in a particular case is 
substantial.125 Indeed, in Muggleton, the CCA found that it was unnecessary to 
establish the normal level of harm because ‘plainly [the victim’s response was] 
greater than one would expect’. 126  This approach is not surprising given the 
extreme difficulty of articulating a standard and any such evaluation of harm will 
be a ‘value judgment’ drawn from the sentencing judge’s life experience and 
expertise.  
If the court relies on VISs from family victims to establish substantial 
emotional harm so as to amount to an aggravating factor, it is evident then that 
there is a significant risk of double counting the harm sustained by family victims 
in homicide offences. Indeed, this risk was acknowledged by the sentencing 
judge in Anderson, who, having used the VIS to prove an aggravating factor, 
found that the VIS could not also be taken into account under section 28(4) of the 
CSPA: 
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Having accepted the emotional harm of the deceased’s family as an aggravating 
factor pursuant to section 21(2)(g), to grant the Crown Prosecutor’s application 
under section 28(4) … to take [the VIS] into account in the determination of 
punishment would, in my opinion, be to carry an unacceptable risk of double-
counting.127 
It is argued however that because the emotional harm sustained by the family 
victims is an inherent characteristic of the nature of the offending, it was already 
a factor in the objective seriousness of the offence before it was taken into 
account as an aggravating factor. Therefore, not taking account of the VIS did 
not avoid the risk of double counting. 
Not only might these difficulties presented by section 21A(2)(g) constrain the 
use of VISs as evidence of aggravating factors in the context of homicide 
sentencing, but the case study shows that the principle in Previtera continues to 
resonate for several members of the NSW Supreme Court. Following Previtera, 
sentencing courts did not consider it appropriate to take account of VISs from 
family victims as an aggravating factor because to do so required the court to 
evaluate the depth and strength of family victims’ suffering at the loss of a loved 
family member. 128  Such an evaluation requires the court to engage in a 
comparative exercise to determine if the suffering described by the VISs in a 
particular case is deeper, more acute, and more serious than that expressed in 
another case.129 This process could involve invidious comparisons and carry a 
risk that, inconsistent with principles of equality and justice, the ultimate penalty 
could reflect the worthiness and perceived ‘value’ of the deceased rather than the 
culpability of the offender. Sentencing judges in several matters within the case 
study (and also several matters excluded from the case study [see above]) 
reiterated the justice concerns expressed in Previtera. R v Merrick [No 5], 
discussed above, provides a salient example of these concerns. It will be recalled 
that in that case, the judge declined the prosecution’s application, and in response 
to the competing assessments of the harm sustained by the family victims 
proffered by the parties, said: 
Those competing submissions to some extent illustrate why courts sentencing 
offenders for an offence involving death have consistently refused to delineate the 
particular harm caused by an individual’s death. That exercise involves the Court 
putting a value on the life of the individual. Here, the Crown argued that that the 
harm caused by [the deceased’s] death was elevated because she was the mother 
of three children; the offender’s representative sought to diminish the harm by 
arguing that the children had others to care for and support them. In my view, 
determining competing arguments of that nature is something that the courts 
should avoid.130 
Though these justice concerns have been the subject of a well-documented 
debate under the former law, 131  these concerns have yet to receive appellate 
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consideration in the context of the new provisions. This uncertainty aside 
however, it is argued that the application of section 21A(2)(g) limits the use of 
VISs as evidence of an aggravating factor to only very rare cases. The 
implications of these findings for family victims will be considered in the next 
section. 
 
IV   THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW LAW FOR FAMILY 
VICTIMS 
This section will address the implications for family victims in relation to 
both instrumental and expressive functions of VISs in sentencing homicide 
offenders. 
  
A   Instrumental Function 
The foregoing reveals that while under the new law sentencing courts are 
more likely to expressly take account of VISs from family victims as an aspect of 
harm done to the community, it is arguable that this does not represent a shift in 
practice and will not enhance the role of VISs in sentencing homicide offenders. 
Under the former law, harm to family victims was an inherent characteristic of 
the nature and seriousness of homicide offending and therefore part of the 
objective seriousness of the offence. The new law does not change this position. 
What does appear to have changed is the potential for VISs to be used as 
evidence of harm that amounts to an aggravating factor. However, as has been 
demonstrated, such use of VISs is particularly problematic in the context of 
homicide offending and it will be in only very rare cases that the emotional harm 
suffered by family victims is so substantial as to exceed the already very 
substantial harm intrinsic to the offending. As a result, it is contended that the 
practical operation of the new law will not change the way in which VISs from 
family victims are used in sentencing, and in the vast majority of matters those 
VISs will not be used to increase the penalty imposed.  
This conclusion raises the issue of family victims’ expectations of the impact 
of their VISs. A key criticism of VIS legislation generally has been that the 
practical operation of the law does not necessarily meet victim expectations 
thereby generating anger, frustration, distress, and victim dissatisfaction with 
sentencing.132 The official information about VISs available to victims through 
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the ‘Victim Impact Statement Information Package’ advises victims that ‘[t]he 
court will only consider the victim impact statement in connection with the 
determination of the sentence to be imposed if it considers that it is appropriate to 
do so’.133 There is no explanation about what it means to ‘consider’ a VIS, when 
that might be ‘appropriate’, or what the outcomes of such consideration might be. 
No doubt this is in large part because it is hard to explain to a layperson the 
highly discretionary nature of sentencing, the multiple and conflicting 
considerations involved, the role of value judgments made in the process of 
instinctive synthesis, and the range of outcomes possible.  
In NSW, many family victims receive advice from a range of victim support 
services. It would not be surprising if some of those services understand from the 
Attorney-General’s statements that, as a result of the new law, VISs will have 
greater influence on penalties imposed and advise family victims accordingly. 
Given the findings of the case study however, such advice could inappropriately 
inflate victim expectations with regard to the impact of their VIS on penalty with 
negative consequences for both victims and confidence in criminal justice 
processes more generally.  
The sentencing judge in Loveridge also alluded to another way in which VISs 
from family victims might count for something – that is, by providing family 
victims with a platform from which to have a say about the proper penalty to be 
imposed. As already noted however, the new law does not change the long-
standing position at common law whereby the attitude of victims of crime to the 
penalty to be imposed is irrelevant. If the legislature intended to change this 
aspect of the law then it would have to do so in very clear language.134 
Ultimately, if family victims expect that their VISs will influence the penalty 
in ‘their’ case in the sense that the penalty imposed will be more severe because 
of their suffering, then their expectations will most likely be disappointed. Not 
only might family victims be disappointed, angered or frustrated that their VIS 
did not achieve what is perceived as the ‘proper’ penalty, but they could also 
experience significant distress and feelings of guilt that their loved one was not 
valued more highly by the law and that their suffering is not sufficiently 
substantial when compared with the suffering of family victims in other cases.135 
It is important not to underestimate the adverse consequences of such pressure 
and guilt for members of an already vulnerable group.136 
The use of VISs in determining penalty under the new law is further 
complicated by the requirement of a prosecution application. Potential adverse 
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consequences for family victims are obvious if the prosecution elects not to apply 
to the sentencing court to have VISs taken into account in sentencing. Guidelines 
published by the NSW Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’) 
inform victims of their three options with regard to VISs: 
 do not provide a VIS;  
 do provide a VIS but it is not taken into account; or 
 do provide a VIS and the prosecution applies to the court to have the 
statement taken into account on sentence for the offence.137 
Family victims are told that the second and third options are subject to 
prosecution approval of the contents of the statement and they are ‘encouraged’ 
to consult with prosecutors during this process.138 As to the third option, the 
guidelines do not explain the basis upon which the prosecution will select cases 
and the case study findings show that the prosecution does not make an 
application in every case. From a practical point of view, whether or not the 
prosecution makes an application, VISs can still be submitted to the court and the 
harm caused to the victims will be part of the objective seriousness of the 
offence. However, it is likely that because many family victims will not 
understand the operation of the law, they could interpret the prosecution’s failure 
to make an application as a lack of respect to the deceased and the deceased’s 
family. Again, the potential for adverse consequences for the victims and 
confidence in the administration of justice are obvious. 
 
B   Expressive Function 
As already argued, the expressive functions of VISs were particularly 
important for many family victims under the former law. Through their VISs, 
victims were provided with opportunities to talk about their experiences, feelings, 
loss and the qualities of the deceased; in turn, sentencing judges could recognise 
and acknowledge victim suffering through their sentencing judgments.139 Ideally, 
the operation of the new law should not interfere with this valued expressive 
function. 
At first glance, the contention that the new provisions do not change the 
practical operation of the law should also mean that the expressive function of 
VISs remains unchanged. And certainly this will generally be the case. However, 
it is arguable that if the prosecution applies to have the VISs taken into account 
as evidence of an aggravating factor in sentencing, then there is potential for 
constraints to be placed on the expressive function of VISs. As part of the 
prosecution case, it is likely that VISs will be proffered as evidence of substantial 
suffering caused to family victims. In order for a VIS to serve this legal function, 
the statement will need to be persuasive in an appropriately legal manner and, in 
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the realm of evidence, it is clear that legal goals can and frequently do conflict 
with victim interests. By virtue of the DPP guidelines relating to VISs 
generally, 140  family victims are already subject to a fairly stringent editing 
process before their VIS can be submitted to the court and this is a major source 
of frustration for family victims.141 Crown lawyers are advised to ensure that 
drafts of VISs from family victims comply with legal requirements before the 
sentencing hearing. 142  During this process, VISs can be changed or rejected. 
However, as a piece of prosecution ‘evidence’, further restrictions could be 
imposed on the content of VISs: the story victims are able to tell, the experiences 
and feelings recounted, and the manner in which the story is told. Drawing on 
research of victims’ experiences in other jurisdictions, family victims could be 
pressured or coerced into crafting and delivering VISs that address certain 
matters (and exclude others) and/or express (or desist from expressing) particular 
emotions in order for that statement to be better aligned with the prosecution’s 
goals.143 These restrictions are not to ensure that the content of the VIS meets 
legal requirements, but to shape the VIS narrative into persuasive ‘legal 
evidence’, to focus on those aspects that might carry more ‘weight’ in the 
process. It is very likely that such constraints on the expressive functions of their 
VISs could exacerbate frustration, anger and distress for family victims. 
A final point to consider is the potential negative impact of the operation of 
the new law on victims’ experiences in the courtroom. The Victim Impact 
Information Package warns victims that the defence is entitled to cross-examine 
them on the contents of their statements.144 Although section 28(4) facilitates 
such cross-examination, research suggests that it is very unlikely to occur and 
should not be a major concern for family victims. Victims are not warned 
however, that if VISs have the potential to increase penalty, then, following 
Tuala, there will be increased pressure on offenders to scrutinise VISs closely 
both before and during the hearing. Such scrutiny might lead to requests to edit 
statements before the hearing or take the form of challenges made to the content 
or weight of the statements during the hearing either by objection or submissions. 
The stakes will be high for homicide offenders if VISs can influence the penalty 
imposed and it is likely that this possibility, together with law as expounded in 
Tuala, will lead to increased scrutiny of VISs and more challenges to the 
statements in the courtroom. Not only could this generate instability and 
disruption in legal proceedings but the potential for negative impacts on many 
family victims is obvious. 
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V   CONCLUSION 
The new law emerged as a political response to the perceived leniency 
afforded to the offender for the manslaughter of Thomas Kelly in 2013. 
According to the then Attorney-General, a major problem in that case was that 
VISs from the family victims did not ‘count for anything’ in the sentencing 
process. If the Attorney-General meant that the VISs did not influence the 
penalty imposed, this claim was a correct statement of the law under Previtera. 
What the Attorney-General did not acknowledge however is that VISs were 
nonetheless relevant to sentencing homicide offenders; VISs were not ignored or 
unimportant in the process. From an instrumental perspective, they exemplified 
harm that is an inherent characteristic of homicide offending and relevant to 
assessment of the objective circumstances of the offence. Judges also used VISs 
in their sentencing judgments to recognise and acknowledge victims’ experiences 
as well as exemplify publicly the devastating consequences of the offending for 
the victim’s family and the wider community. From an expressive perspective, 
VISs provided family victims with an opportunity to be involved in the legal 
process, to speak about their experiences of victimisation and, perhaps most 
importantly, to render the deceased visible in the proceedings.  
According to Parliament, the former approach to VISs in homicide matters 
constituted insufficient legal recognition of family victim suffering in sentencing. 
The second reading speech and explanatory memoranda indicate parliamentary 
intention to overrule Previtera and enable sentencing courts to use VISs to 
influence the penalty imposed in ‘appropriate’ cases. In this way, the role of VISs 
in sentencing homicide offenders would be enhanced and VISs would ‘count for 
something’ in the process. 
It has been argued however, that the new law has not enhanced the role of 
VISs in sentencing homicide offenders, nor is it likely to change the manner in 
which VISs from family victims are used in sentencing in the vast majority of 
cases. The harm sustained by family victims continues to be relevant to the 
objective circumstances of the offending and homicide offences by their very 
nature are serious. Furthermore, given the very real risk of double-counting, it 
will only be in very rare cases that a VIS could be used as evidence of an 
aggravating factor so as to increase the penalty to be imposed on the offender. It 
is highly doubtful that the result in Loveridge (that is, as re-sentenced by the 
CCA) would have been different under the new law. Manslaughter offences are 
notoriously difficult to sentence given the wide-ranging circumstances of each 
case. As to the seriousness of the offence, while the outcomes – death and loss to 
family victims – are the same as murder, the culpability of the offender is lower 
and the penalty will not be as severe. Victim impact statements will not change 
this outcome.  
Not only could victim expectations with regard to the impact of their VIS on 
penalty be frustrated but the operation of the new law has the potential for 
significant adverse impacts on their experiences in the courtroom including: 
pressure or coercion to submit a VIS in circumstances where they may not want 
to; further encroachment on their agency and autonomy in preparing and 
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delivering their VIS, notably constraints on what can be expressed; feelings of 
distress, anger and guilt if it is perceived that their VISs fail to achieve the 
penalty desired; and overall decline in confidence in criminal justice processes.  
Ultimately, the law is a blunt instrument in the context of punishment and 
sentencing: it cannot and should not be put forward as a method to assuage 
victim suffering in the aftermath of homicide. As McCallum J said in R v 
Jenbare: 
[the VISs] painted a picture of a warm and vivacious woman with a beautiful soul. 
I have had regard to that material in the manner allowed by law [citing Halloun 
and Sumpton]. I thank the authors of those statements for sharing their stories of 
[the deceased’s] life. Her death has caused intense pain and grief … On behalf of 
the Court, I pay my respect to the family and acknowledge their grief and sadness. 
It is recognised that the sentence to be imposed on the offender will not bring 
redress for their loss. That is not and could not appropriately be the object of 
sentencing by a court. The loss of a human life is tragic; the recognition of that 
fact is an important premise of the sentencing task. It will be understood, at the 
same time, that a just criminal justice system must have regard to all 
considerations that serve the established objects of the sentencing process.145 
The limitations of the law for this purpose must be recognised and reflected 
in criminal justice policy. Rather than changing the language but not the 
operation of the law, family victims would be assisted by greater government 
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